Suchergebnisse

3.2 The pathologies of public law3.3 The public meaning of the principle of authority; 3.4 The barbarism of Nazi power; 4 Toward public justice; 4.1 Rawls on ideal and nonideal theory; 4.2 Hart's reformist project; 4.3 Public justice as an ideal and as a duty; 4.4 Progress and particularity; Part II The constitutional dimension; 5 The modern constitutional state; 5.1 The problem of accountability; 5.2 A new form of government; 5.3 Assessing commonwealth constitutionalism; 5.4 A reply to Waldron; Part III The doctrinal dimension; 6 Constitutional reform; 6.1 The rise of eternity clauses.

Since the early days of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has applied a two-stage framework to determine whether legislation complies with the Charter. The first stage considers whether the legislation infringes a right or freedom. The second determines whether the infringement is demonstrably justified. In Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), the dissenting opinion of Côté and Brown JJ. rejects this framework and formulates an alternative. Their central claim is that the Charter does not justify the infringement of the rights that it elaborates. Accordingly, instead of focusing on whether an infringement is justified, courts should focus on whether the limit that shapes the "right's outer boundaries" is justified. A limit that is justified does not infringe a right. A limit that infringes a right cannot be justified.